EKOMA : Jurnal Ekonomi, Manajemen, Akuntansi
Vol.5, No.6, September 2026

The Impact of ESG Disclosure on Real Earnings Management with Firm Size Moderation: A Study on Textile and Retail Sectors

Jihan Zasqia Rizky Syahrudin[1], Hana Dhayan[2], Nina Febriana Dosinta[3]
[1,2,3] Universitas Tanjungpura, Indonesia
E-mail: B1034231023@student.untan.ac.id[1], hdhayan@ekonomi.untan.ac.id[2], nina.febriana.d@ekonomi.untan.ac.id[3]

Article History:
Received: 09 Juli 2026
Revised: 25 Agustus 2026
Accepted: 15 September 2026

Keywords: *ESG Disclosure; Real Earnings Management; Firm Size; Textile and Retail Sectors; Legitimacy Theory.*

Abstract: *This study aims to analyze the effect of Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) disclosure on Real Earnings Management (REM), with firm size as a moderating variable. Employing an associative quantitative research design, samples were selected using a purposive sampling method, yielding 14 textile, garment, and retail companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange for the 2022–2024 period. Data were analyzed using the Random Effects (RE) model, with a Fixed Effects (FE) model applied as a robustness check. The results indicate that the moderation model offers superior explanatory power, demonstrated by a significant increase in the coefficient of determination from 0.046 to 0.304 after the interaction variable was introduced. The findings prove that ESG disclosure has a negative effect on REM, but this relationship is positively moderated by firm size. This indicates that in larger firms, the effectiveness of ESG in suppressing earnings manipulation tends to weaken due to operational complexity and legitimacy pressures. This study confirms that firm size is an essential component in evaluating the integrity of sustainability reporting.*

INTRODUCTION

In today's competitive business environment, companies are expected not only to achieve strong financial performance but also to uphold ethical and sustainable practices. These expectations are reflected in Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) indicators, which assess how companies manage environmental responsibilities, social impacts, and governance practices (Almubarak et al., 2023; Tanujaya & Dharmawan, 2025). Maintaining a positive ESG profile is essential for preserving stakeholder trust and corporate legitimacy, consequently, companies may attempt to present favorable financial performance through earnings management practices (Vatis et al., 2025). Real earnings management manipulates financial outcomes by altering actual business operations rather than accounting estimates. This integration into daily activities makes it significantly harder to detect than accrual earnings management. (Fadhilah & Suranta, 2023; Liu et al., 2023). Since profit is considered a key indicator of corporate performance, it frequently becomes the focus of managerial manipulation (Chu et al., 2019).

Stakeholders are demanding more transparency and accountability from corporations regarding their sustainability practices, making ESG reporting crucial for evaluating responsible corporate behavior in alignment with sustainable development principles (Alsayegh et al., 2020). The textile and garment industry in Indonesia is one of the country's major manufacturing sectors, contributing significantly to exports and employment. However, the industry has also faced criticism for environmental issues, particularly industrial waste management. One notable case involved Sri Rejeki Isman Tbk (Sritex), which raised concerns regarding unsustainable waste disposal practices and environmental accountability (Putra, 2017; Wu et al., 2022). Heightened scrutiny of environmentally sensitive sectors pressures textile and garment firms to balance responsible business practices with stakeholder expectations. This environment may drive managers to employ real earnings management (REM) to signal financial resilience. Thus, investigating the link between ESG performance and REM is critical to verifying whether firms with strong sustainability profiles maintain superior financial reporting integrity.

LITERATURE REVIEW

Legitimacy Theory

Dowling and Pfeffer (1975) Legitimacy theory suggests that firms operate within societal norms to maintain a "social contract." In Indonesia's textile sector, environmental scandals like the Sritex waste failure, heighten the need for ESG disclosure to restore public trust. However, intense competitive pressure often creates a paradox: managers may use ESG transparency as a reputational shield while simultaneously employing Real Earnings Management (REM). By manipulating operational activities to signal financial stability, companies attempt to satisfy stakeholders' ethical and economic expectations concurrently, potentially using sustainability claims to mask underlying financial distortion.


Stakeholder Theory

Freeman (1984) suggests that stakeholder theory explains the relationship between companies and individuals or groups to build trust and achieve companies' sustainability. In Indonesia's textile sector, ESG disclosure helps mitigate information asymmetry amid environmental scrutiny. However, firms often face "double pressure": public demands for transparency versus investor expectations for profitability. This conflict can drive a decoupling strategy where managers use ESG reports as a reputational shield while employing Real Earnings Management (REM). By manipulating operations to meet financial targets, companies prioritize the demands of dominant stakeholders, potentially masking financial distortion behind a facade of sustainability.

Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) Performance

ESG performance is a metric that assesses a firm's integration of environmental responsibility, social impact, and governance into its operational strategy (Andini, 2024; Vatis et al., 2025). The ESG framework drives environmental, social, and governance integrity, where robust governance fosters the transparency and accountability needed to theoretically constrain opportunistic real earnings manipulation in the textile industry. Prior studies provide inconsistent evidence regarding the relationship between ESG disclosure and Real Earnings Management (REM). Some studies argue that ESG disclosure improves monitoring quality, enhances corporate transparency, and reduces opportunistic managerial behavior, thereby constraining REM

practices (Andriani et al., 2022; Fadhilah et al., 2023; Vatis et al., 2025). Conversely, other studies suggest that ESG disclosure may function symbolically as a legitimacy mechanism, enabling firms to maintain stakeholder trust while still engaging in operational manipulation to achieve financial targets (Sagita et al., 2026; Santoso et al., 2026). These inconsistent findings imply that the effectiveness of ESG disclosure in limiting REM may depend on firm-specific characteristics, particularly firm size, which can influence managerial incentives, monitoring intensity, and the operational flexibility required to engage in real earnings manipulation (Liu et al., 2023; Vatis et al., 2025).



Despite growing literature on ESG and earnings management, empirical evidence remains inconclusive within emerging market environmentally sensitive industries. Furthermore, studies rarely examine how firm size moderates the ESG–REM relationship particularly in the Indonesian textile and retail sectors following mandatory sustainability reporting mandates. This study addresses this gap by investigating whether firm size alters the effectiveness of ESG disclosure in constraining REM practices.

H1: Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) disclosure has a significant effect on Real Earnings Management (REM).
H2: Firm size has a significant effect on Real Earnings Management.
H3: ESG disclosure and firm size simultaneously affect Real Earnings Management.
H4: Firm size moderates the effect of ESG disclosure on Real Earnings Management.

METHOD

This study utilizes a quantitative associative research design to analyze the impact of ESG disclosure on Real Earnings Management (REM), featuring firm size as a moderating variable. The population targets Indonesian textile, garment, and retail firms listed on the IDX (2022–2024), sectors specifically chosen for their high environmental sensitivity and reporting requirements under OJK Regulation No. 51/POJK.03/2017. Through purposive sampling, 14 companies were selected based on the consistent publication of annual and sustainability reports and the availability of essential financial data. The study employs an unbalanced panel format to maximize the dataset's representativeness. PT Soraya Berjaya Indonesia Tbk is maintained in the assessment despite the absence of 2021 financial data, emphasizing its essential ESG and cash flow insights from earlier years, particularly after the full implementation of mandatory sustainability reporting in Indonesia.

The variables in this study are operationalized to capture the dynamics of corporate reporting and operational manipulation. The dependent variable, Real Earnings Management (REM), is estimated using the Roychowdhury (2006) framework. Due to specific data constraints regarding inventory reporting within the sample, REM is proxied by aggregating two components:

Abnormal Cash Flow from Operations

$$\frac{CFO_{it}}{A_{it-1}} = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 \left(\frac{1}{A_{it-1}}\right) + \beta_1 \left(\frac{S_{it}}{A_{it-1}}\right) + \beta_2 \left(\frac{\Delta S_{it}}{A_{it-1}}\right) + \sum Year + \epsilon_{it}$$

Abnormal Discretionary Expenses

$$\frac{DISEXP_{it}}{A_{it-1}} = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 \left(\frac{1}{A_{it-1}}\right) + \beta \left(\frac{S_{it}}{A_{it-1}}\right) + \sum Year + \epsilon_{it}$$

A higher positive value indicates more aggressive upward earnings manipulation. The independent variable, ESG Disclosure, is quantified through a disclosure scoring method that assesses the comprehensiveness of environmental, social, and governance information within sustainability reports. Finally, Firm Size serves as the moderating variable, measured by the natural logarithm of total assets (Ln Total Assets) to account for variations in corporate scale and resource availability.

RESULT AND DISCUSSION

Table 1. Descriptive Statistics of Research Variables

Variable	N	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Median	Max
REM (−Ab/CFO – Ab/DISX)	42	−0,017	0,221	−0,501	0,038	0,406
Ab/CFO (Abnormal CFO)	42	0,019	0,124	−0,103	−0,016	0,615
Ab DISX (Abnormal Disc. Exp.)	42	−0,002	0,194	−0,387	−0,048	0,437
ESG Disclosure Score (X1)	42	0,566	0,185	0,121	0,595	0,871
Firm Size / ln(Total Aset) (X2)	42	28,110	1,616	24,011	27,688	31,016

Table 1 reveals an average ESG disclosure score of 0.566 (SD = 0.185), with values ranging from 0.121 to 0.871, indicating significant disparities in sustainability reporting transparency across the sample. Firm Size, measured by the natural logarithm of total assets, averages 28.110 (range: 24.011–31.016), reflecting high heterogeneity in scale from small textile firms to large national retailers. The dependent variable, REM, shows a mean near zero (-0.017), suggesting no systematic industry-wide trend toward real earnings manipulation during the observation period.

The dependent variable, Real Earnings Management (REM), was estimated using the Roychowdhury (2006) framework through three distinct regression models: normal operating cash flow, production costs, and discretionary expenses (Roychowdhury, 2006). To account for annual variations, the models were estimated using Pooled Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) with

year dummies. This pooled framework was adopted over annual cross-sectional estimation to enhance statistical reliability and parameter consistency, especially given the limited sample size per year (Hoechle, 2007).

Table 2. Estimation Results of Normal REM Models (Roychowdhury, 2006)

Model	Predictor	N	R^2	F-stat	p-value
Normal CFO	*1/A, S/A, ΔS/A* + year dummies	59	0,234	2,653	0,025*
Normal PROD	*1/A, S/A, ΔS/A, ΔSlag/A* + year dummies	42	0,798	23,040	<0,001***
Normal DISX	*1/A, Slag/A* + year dummies	59	0,304	4,626	0,001***

Note: p<0.01; p<0.05; p<0.10. A = total assets (t−1);
S = sales; ΔS = change in sales; Slag = previous year's sales.

As presented in Table 2, all three estimation models achieved a statistically significant goodness of fit. The production cost model demonstrated the highest explanatory power with an R-squared of 0.798 (F = 23.040; p < 0.001), while the operating cash flow and discretionary expenditure models yielded R- squared values of 0.234 and 0.304, respectively. The residuals from these regressions represent the abnormal components used to construct the aggregate REM proxy. Due to inventory data constraints in the sample, the final REM value is calculated as REM = -Ab\CFO - Ab\DISX. Positive REM values indicate a tendency toward upward earnings manipulation through real activities, while negative values suggest the opposite (Roychowdhury, 2006).

Before interpreting the panel regression results, a Hausman test was conducted to determine the most appropriate model between the Fixed Effects (FE) and Random Effects (RE) estimators (Hausman, 1978). The Hausman test resulted in a negative chi-square statistic ($\chi^2 = -21.78$; p = 1.000), indicating insufficient evidence to reject the random effects assumption in unbalanced panel data with limited observations, meaning the null hypothesis cannot be rejected (Baltagi, 2021; Dechow et al., 2010). Accordingly, the RE model is considered more appropriate than the FE model, as the FE estimator may become statistically inefficient when within-entity variation is relatively small compared to between-entity variation (Wooldridge, 2010). Therefore, the main hypothesis testing employs the RE model, while the FE model is presented as a robustness check.

Table 3. Panel Data Regression Results (Random Effects Model, 2022–2024)

Variable	β (M1)	p	β (M2)	p	β (M3)	p
Constant	0,089	0,354	−0,715	0,447	2,876	0,040**
ESG Disclosure (X1)	−0,186	0,174	−0,206	0,141	−6,515	0,001***
Firm Size (X2)	—	—	0,029	0,391	−0,102	0,043**
ESG × Firm Size (X1×X2)	—	—	—	—	0,230	0,001***

R^2	0,046		0,064		0,304	
F-statistic	1,912	0,174	1,328	0,277	5,539	0,003***

*Note: *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.10. N = 42 observations; 14 companies; period 2022–2024 (unbalanced panel). Entity cluster-based standard errors.*

Before discussing the results for each hypothesis, an important methodological finding from Table 3 should be highlighted. Model 1 and Model 2, which include ESG disclosure and Firm Size separately without the interaction term, produce statistically insignificant coefficients ($p > 0.10$) and insignificant overall F-statistics. This does not necessarily indicate the absence of an effect on real earnings management (REM), but rather suggests potential model misspecification. In econometric modeling, omitting a crucial interaction term when the true relationship is conditional can severely bias the direct effects and inflate standard errors, leading to type II errors (Wooldridge, 2010). The relationship between ESG disclosure and REM appears to be conditional on firm size, such that estimating only the direct effects without including the interaction term may lead to biased and insignificant coefficients. Once the interaction term is introduced in Model 3, all coefficients become statistically significant and the R^2 increases substantially from 0.046 to 0.304, indicating that Firm Size serves as an essential moderating component in the model.

Hypothesis 1 examines whether ESG disclosure affects real earnings management (REM). The results show a coefficient of $\beta = -6.515$ with a significance level of $p = 0.001$ ($p < 0.01$), indicating that H1 is supported. The negative relationship suggests that higher ESG disclosure is associated with lower levels of REM. This finding supports the view that stronger ESG transparency reflects better corporate governance and stricter internal monitoring mechanisms, which limit managers' opportunistic behavior in manipulating real operating activities to achieve earnings targets. According to stakeholder and agency theories, comprehensive non-financial reporting reduces information asymmetry, subjecting managerial actions to greater public scrutiny and reducing the leeway for hidden operational manipulations (Velte, 2017). However, the magnitude of this coefficient should be interpreted alongside its interaction with Firm Size, as the marginal effect of ESG on REM varies depending on company size.

Hypothesis 2 examines whether Firm Size affects real earnings management (REM). The results show a coefficient of $\beta = -0.102$ with a significance level of $p = 0.043$ ($p < 0.05$), indicating that H2 is supported. The negative coefficient suggests that larger firms tend to engage in lower levels of REM. This finding may be explained by the stronger external monitoring typically faced by large firms, including greater scrutiny from market analysts, institutional investors, and more extensive disclosure requirements, which collectively constrain managers' ability to manipulate real operating activities (Dechow et al., 2010). Notably, the significance of Firm Size only emerges after the interaction term is included, confirming that the effect of firm size on REM depends on the level of ESG disclosure.

Hypothesis 3 examines the simultaneous effect of ESG disclosure and Firm Size on real earnings management (REM). The results are confirmed by the Model 3 F-statistic of $F = 5.539$ with $p = 0.003$ ($p < 0.01$), indicating that H3 is supported. The significant F-value suggests that ESG disclosure and Firm Size jointly contribute to explaining variations in REM across firms and over

time. In addition, the R^2 value of 0.304 indicates that the model explains approximately 30.4% of the variation in REM, which is considered adequate for a panel data model with limited explanatory variables. In empirical corporate finance and accounting panel data settings, an explanatory power within this range is considered highly adequate, as it reflects complex cross-sectional human and managerial heterogeneities that cannot be fully captured by standalone metrics (Wooldridge, 2010).

Hypothesis 4 which states that firm size moderates the effect of ESG disclosure on real earnings management (REM), yields an interaction coefficient of $\beta = +0.230$ with a significance level of $p = 0.001$ ($p < 0.01$). Thus, H4 is supported. The positive sign of the interaction coefficient indicates that firm size acts as a weakening moderator meaning that in larger firms, the negative effect of ESG disclosure on REM becomes less intense. To quantify the magnitude of this moderating effect more concretely, the marginal effect of ESG on REM can be formulated as: $\partial REM/\partial ESG = -6.515 + 0.230 \times SIZE$ (Brambor et al., 2006). Using this formula, the threshold (break-even point) at which the effect of ESG on REM becomes zero is calculated as $SIZE = 6.515 / 0.230 \approx 28.37$. This value is very close to the sample mean of firm size (mean = 28.11), implying that for firms with total assets below $e^{28.37}$ (approximately IDR 2.1 trillion), ESG disclosure effectively suppresses REM. Conversely, for firms with assets above this threshold, the suppressing effect of ESG begins to diminish and could potentially reverse direction.

This condition can be explained through two interrelated mechanisms. First, in large firms that possess more abundant resources and face higher stakeholder expectation pressures, ESG disclosure is often employed as a legitimation and reputation management strategy rather than as a reflection of genuine governance commitment (Chu et al., 2019; Suchman, 1995). Consequently, even when ESG scores are high, managers in large firms still retain both the incentives and the capacity to exploit REM mechanisms that are more difficult for external parties to detect. Second, the inherent operational complexity of large firms creates more opportunities within real activities such as variations in customer credit policies, production cycles, and overhead cost management which can be utilized as means of earnings manipulation without directly violating applicable accounting standards.

Table 4. Robustness Test Results (Fixed Effects Model)

Variable	β (FE)	Std. Error	t-stat	p-value
ESG Disclosure (X1)	−7,404	1,729	−4,282	<0,001***
Firm Size (X2)	−0,138	0,087	−1,578	0,127
ESG × Firm Size (X1×X2)	0,263	0,063	4,192	<0,001***

*Note: ***p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.10. N = 42; R^2 = 0.442. The FE model includes fixed entity effects.*

As a robustness check, the panel regression was also estimated using the Fixed Effects (FE) model. The results presented in Table 4 demonstrate strong consistency in direction and significance with the Random Effects (RE) model: ESG coefficient = –7.404 ($p < 0.001$) and interaction coefficient (ESG × Firm Size) = +0.263 ($p < 0.001$). The R^2 value of the FE model is 0.442, which is higher than that of the RE model (0.304), indicating that the FE model captures

within-entity variation more effectively. The consistency of findings between the RE and FE models provides stronger confidence in the reliability of the obtained results. The only notable difference is that the coefficient of Firm Size in the FE model is not significant (p = 0.127), which is likely attributable to limited within-entity variation of firm size over the three-year horizon – a result that is conceptually reasonable given that total assets tend not to change drastically in the short term.

Table 5. Summary of Hypothesis Testing Results

Hypothesis	Koef.	p-value	Arah	Result
H1: *ESG* → REM	−6,515	0,001***	Negative	Supported
H2: *Firm Size* → REM	−0,102	0,043**	Negative	Supported
H3: *ESG* + *Firm Size* → REM (simultaneous)	F=5,539	0,003***	—	Supported
H4: *Firm Size* moderating *ESG* → REM	+0,230	0,001***	Positive (weaken)	Supported

*Notes: *** p<0,01; ** p<0,05; * p<0,10. Seluruh hipotesis diuji menggunakan Model 3 (RE). Moderasi bersifat melemahkan; titik impas SIZE* ≈ 28,37.*

Overall, all four hypotheses formulated in this study received empirical support. ESG disclosure was found to have a negative and significant effect on real earnings management (H1), firm size exhibited a negative and significant effect on REM (H2), both variables simultaneously exerted a significant effect (H3), and firm size was proven to moderate – specifically, to weaken – the negative relationship between ESG disclosure and REM (H4). Collectively, these findings suggest that ESG disclosure policies have tangible relevance to the financial reporting quality of companies in the Indonesian textile, garment, and retail sectors. However, their effectiveness in curbing real earnings management practices is conditional and cannot be disentangled from the context of each firm's scale of operations.

CONCLUSION

This study concludes that ESG disclosure significantly reduces Real Earnings Management (REM) within the Indonesian textile and retail sectors. The findings indicate that higher ESG transparency reflects superior corporate governance and stricter internal monitoring, which effectively constrains managers from manipulating real operating activities to meet financial targets. Additionally, firm size independently exhibits a negative effect on REM, as larger companies face heightened external scrutiny from analysts and institutional investors, limiting their capacity for operational manipulation. However, the effectiveness of ESG in curbing REM is not absolute and is critically moderated by firm size. The results demonstrate that in larger firms, the negative relationship between ESG disclosure and REM becomes less intense. This suggests a "double pressure" paradox where large firms, facing high stakeholder expectations and operational complexity, may utilize ESG disclosure as a reputational shield or legitimacy strategy rather than a genuine commitment to transparency. The calculation of a threshold value (Size ≈ 28.37) confirms that for firms below this scale, ESG disclosure remains a powerful tool for suppressing REM. Conversely, as firms exceed this size, the suppressing effect of ESG begins to

diminish. Ultimately, this research underscores that while ESG reporting is a vital component of financial reporting quality, its impact cannot be disentangled from the firm's scale of operations.

REFERENCES

Almubarak, W. I., Chebbi, K., & Ammer, M. A. (2023). Unveiling the Connection among ESG, Earnings Management, and Financial Distress: Insights from an Emerging Market. *Sustainability*, *15*(16), 12348. https://doi.org/10.3390/su151612348

Alsayegh, M. F., Abdul Rahman, R., & Homayoun, S. (2020). Corporate Economic, Environmental, and Social Sustainability Performance Transformation through ESG Disclosure. *Sustainability*, *12*(9), 3910. https://doi.org/10.3390/su12093910

Andini, F. (2024). *The Effect of ESG Disclosure on Financial Performance with Earnings Management as an Intervening Variable*. *3*(4).

Andriani, N., & Arsjah, R. J. (2022). PENGARUH INTELLECTUAL CAPITAL DAN ESG TERHADAP MANAJEMEN LABA YANG DIMODERASI OLEH PROFITABILITAS. *Jurnal Ekonomi Trisakti*, *2*(2), 595–610. https://doi.org/10.25105/jet.v2i2.14646

Baltagi, B. H. (2021). *Econometric Analysis of Panel Data*. Springer International Publishing. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-53953-5

Brambor, T., Clark, W. R., & Golder, M. (2006). *Understanding interaction models: Improving empirical analyses. Political Analysis, 14(1), 63-82.*

Chu, J., Dechow, P. M., Hui, K. W., & Wang, A. Y. (2019). Maintaining a Reputation for Consistently Beating Earnings Expectations and the Slippery Slope to Earnings Manipulation. *Contemporary Accounting Research*, *36*(4), 1966–1998. https://doi.org/10.1111/1911-3846.12492

Dechow, P., Ge, W., & Schrand, C. (2010). Understanding earnings quality: A review of the proxies, their determinants and their consequences. *Journal of Accounting and Economics*, *50*(2–3), 344–401. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jacceco.2010.09.001

Fadhilah, A. N., & Suranta, E. (2023). The Effect of Accrual Earnings Management and Real Earnings Management on Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) Reporting Performance. *Ilomata International Journal of Tax and Accounting*, *5*(1), 77–96. https://doi.org/10.52728/ijtc.v5i1.1001

Freeman, R. E. E. (1984). A Stakeholder Approach to Strategic Management. *Pitman.*

Hausman, J. A. (1978). Specification Tests in Econometrics. *Econometrica*, *46*(6), 1251. https://doi.org/10.2307/1913827

Hoechle, D. (2007). Robust Standard Errors for Panel Regressions with Cross-Sectional Dependence. *The Stata Journal: Promoting Communications on Statistics and Stata*, *7*(3), 281–312. https://doi.org/10.1177/1536867X0700700301

Liu, T., Abdelbaky, A., Elamer, A. A., & Elmahgoub, M. (2023). Real earnings management and ESG disclosure in emerging markets: The moderating effect of managerial ownership from a social norm perspective. *Heliyon*, *9*(12), e22832. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.heliyon.2023.e22832

Putra, D. M. (2017). Kontribusi Industri Tekstil dalam Penggunaan Bahan Berbahaya dan Beracun Terhadap Rusaknya Sungai Citarum. *Jurnal Hukum Lingkungan Indonesia*, *3*(1), 133–152. https://doi.org/10.38011/jhli.v3i1.37

Roychowdhury, S. (2006). Earnings management through real activities manipulation. *Journal of Accounting and Economics*, *42*(3), 335–370. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jacceco.2006.01.002

Sagita, D., Meutia, I., & Yusrianti, H. (2026). The Influence of Sustainability Performance and

Institutional Ownership on Earnings Management In ASEAN Countries. *Owner*, *10*(1), 327–342. https://doi.org/10.33395/owner.v10i1.2956

Santoso, E. B., Yusup, A. K., & Triani, N. N. A. (2026). Legitimacy Strategies: SDG Disclosure, Earnings Management, and Accounting Changes in Indonesian Banking. *Jurnal Akuntansi*, *30*(1), 195–222. https://doi.org/10.24912/ja.v30i1.3482

Suchman, M. C. (1995). *MANAGING LEGITIMACY: STRATEGIC AND INSTITUTIONAL APPROACHES*.

Tanujaya, K., & Dharmawan, C. (2025). *THE IMPACT OF ESG PERFORMANCE AND CORPORATE FINANCIAL CONDITION ON EARNINGS MANAGEMENT PRACTICES IN INDONESIA*. *14*.

Vatis, S. E., Drogalas, G., Persakis, A., & Chytis, E. (2025). The Impact of ESG on Earnings Quality and Real Earnings Management: The Role of Firm Size. *Sustainability*, *17*(11), 5027. https://doi.org/10.3390/su17115027

Velte, P. (2017). Does ESG performance have an impact on financial performance? Evidence from Germany. *Journal of Global Responsibility*, *8*(2), 169–178. https://doi.org/10.1108/JGR-11-2016-0029

Wooldridge, J. M. (2010). *Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data*.

Wu, Z., Zhou, L., Ding, X., Wu, X., & Wang, L. (2022). Knowledge roadmap of sustainable development in the textile and apparel industry: A scientometric analysis. *Fashion and Textiles*, *9*(1), 35. https://doi.org/10.1186/s40691-022-00308-6